The Bangsamoro Problem is one such sovereignty-based conflict. In this case, the Philippine nation-state, a creation of foreign colonialism and imperialism, claims sovereignty over the Bangsamoro homeland, once the territory of independent Moro sultanate states. The Moros have invariably contested this claim ever since the Bangsamoro Homeland was incorporated into the Philippine nation-state without the plebiscitary consent of the Bangsamoro people. The Moros were never conquered militarily by the Filipinos or, before them, by the Spaniards. It was the United States, with its technological superiority, that subdued the Moros militarily and later on, over the protestations of the latter, handed them over to the Philippine nation-state initially in 1935 and finally in 1946 when independence was granted to the Filipinos. The Moro Homeland, thereafter, became part of the national territory of an independent Philippine nation-state but is treated more as a colony by the latter. The Moros, however, have resisted Filipino colonial rule, and through various forms and means have reasserted their separate identity as a nation; hence, the sovereignty-based conflict in Mindanao. The conflict in Northern Ireland, like the Bangsamoro Problem, is a sovereignty-based conflict. Both are multi-dimensional in character: political, nationality-based, and compounded by social, cultural and religious undertones. Both are also profoundly violent. But, what made Northern Ireland more complicated is that the conflict was not merely a ‘one state-versus-one captive nation’ configuration. There were two nation-states (‘sovereignties’) and two peoples/communities involved with each of the latter claiming right of self-determination – a right that was defined by and viewed from political positions diametrically opposed to each other and by intense loyalty to one of the two sovereign states in question.
Yet, for all the complexities involved, the Northern Ireland problem has been resolved – or rather, the armed conflict that characterized it - when all the parties to the conflict decided to end the vicious and debilitating violence that plagued the province since the 60s. The political formula that came out of the negotiating table is in itself a unique political arrangement that brought hitherto bitter foes together to settle a long-standing political-cum-religious dispute through peaceful democratic processes that would allow the people of Northern Ireland themselves to chart their future.
As a brief backgrounder, Ireland, whose people are predominantly Celtic and Catholic, came under English rule beginning in the 12th century when Anglo-Norman knights landed on its shores to intervene in local feuds among Irish chieftains. Subsequently, the only English Pope, Hadrian IV, issued a papal bull “Lauda Abiliter” in 1155-56 mandating King Henry II of England to invade Ireland. By the Act of Union in 1800, Ireland became an integral part of the predominantly Protestant Great Britain, now officially known as the United Kingdom (UK).
During the 19th century, an Irish independence movement took shape. Following a nationalist revolt against British rule in 1921, a greater portion of the island of Ireland became a separate Catholic-dominated free state under the Irish-Anglo Treaty of 1921. In 1949, following the passage of the Republic of Ireland Act, Ireland finally severed its ties with Great Britain and became a fully independent state, the Republic of Ireland or Eire.
However, Northern Ireland, or the six counties (also called Ulster) comprising it where Protestants are in the majority, remained a part of the UK. The Northern Irish Protestants, who are descendants of Scottish, Welsh and English settlers, disdained joining a Catholic-dominated Irish Republic in the south for fear of being a minority therein and thus suffer discrimination by the Catholics. Apparently, the impact of the Reformation in the 16th Century still had its lasting effects on the Protestants. Consequently, they preferred to stay with Great Britain and until today consider themselves full-fledged British. They are referred to as Loyalists or Unionists. Northern Ireland remained a province of UK.
The minority Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland took on an opposite view. They see Northern Ireland as territorially a part of the whole of Ireland and should therefore be with the Irish Republic. Thus, they are also called Nationalists or Republicans. This nationalist sentiment triggered inter-communal suspicions and antagonisms that eventually led to the discrimination of the Irish Catholics in the hands of the Irish Protestants or the Unionists, who remained fiercely loyal to Britain and dominated the political life of Northern Ireland under British tutelage.
In the late 60s, a civil rights movement by the Irish Catholics arose in Northern Ireland. The demonstrations and rallies held by the civil rights movement led to riots and bloody clashes on the streets of Belfast (capital of Northern Ireland) and other towns as the Protestants also held their own counter-demonstrations and rallies. These violent confrontations between the Protestant (Unionist or Loyalist) and Catholic (Nationalist or Republican) communities in Northern Ireland that this animus engendered are what have been popularly called “The Troubles”.
The Troubles further saw the rise of armed paramilitaries on both sides of the communal divide. From the ranks of the Irish Catholics, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), officially referred to as the ‘Provisional Irish Republican Army’ or ‘Provos’, as well as its political arm, Sinn Fein, emerged and engaged both the British Army (which was deployed in Northern Ireland in 1969 to maintain law and order) and the Unionist paramilitaries in armed struggle. Meanwhile, not to be outdone, the Unionists, such as the uncompromising ‘Orangemen’ (from the Protestant ‘Order of Orange’), organized their own armed paramilitaries (Ulster Volunteer Force (UDF), Ulster Defense Organization (UDO), Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), etc.) not only to confront the armed threat from the IRA but also to secure and perpetuate Unionist dominance over Northern Ireland and thus keep the latter in British hands. The Unionist paramilitaries also engaged in violence against Irish nationalists using assassination to eliminate them and resorting to attacks on known Republican strongholds. A case in point, Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein, had been subjected to such assassination attempts and in fact had been wounded in 1984 by Unionist paramilitaries.
The result was that for about thirty years, Northern Ireland became a battleground between Unionists loyal to Great Britain on one hand and the Republicans who gave their allegiance to the Republic of Ireland on the other. The IRA resorted to urban warfare, carrying out hundreds of bombings that turned major cities such as Belfast and Londonerry into cities of walls, called security walls (now ‘peace walls’), which divided these urban centers into Unionist (Protestant) and Republican (Catholic) enclaves and territories. These walls not only served to demarcate each side’s territory but also as propaganda walls adorned with political murals and slogans that depicted the struggles and bannered the justness of the protagonists’ respective causes and the exploits of their heroes and martyrs who fell in the battlefield or died in prison.
To exacerbate the situation, the IRA expanded its urban guerrilla operations as far as London. In 1979, an IRA bomb killed Lord Louis Mountbatten, last British Viceroy of India, and a member of England’s Royal Family and decorated hero of World War II.
As a member of the four-man MILF Peace Panel delegation (MILF Panel Chair Mohagher Iqbal, Atty. Michael Mastura, Abdullah Kamlian and myself) that visited Belfast in the summer month of June 2009 upon the invitation of the British Government, I was astonished by the complexity that characterized the conflict in Northern Ireland. More than that, I was amazed at how the people of Northern Ireland - both Unionists and Republicans - and the governments of the UK and the Irish Republic were able to handle this complexity, surmount and resolve the stumbling blocks as a result of it, and end three decades of bloody armed confrontation.
The picture that presented itself to us in our talks with all the actors involved in the conflict during our visits to London and Belfast is quite fascinating because it revealed things about the Northern Ireland peace process which until then were unknown to us. It also validated important principles which we, in the MILF Peace Panel, have held on to in our engagement with the Filipino negotiators and their principal, the Philippine Government.
But going back to the Northern Ireland issue, this is what we learned: the conflict involved three interfacing layers.
At the first layer, we have the Unionists, who staunchly advocate the permanent union of Northern Ireland with the United Kingdom, and are thus fiercely opposed to the sovereignty and territorial claim of the Republic of Ireland over the province. At the opposite end are the Republicans who firmly believe that Northern Ireland is part of the Irish Republic and should rightly belong to it; thus, they passionately oppose the continued exercise of British sovereignty over the province. Interestingly enough, both Unionists and Republicans invoke their right of self-determination to justify their actions against each other and they define such right in accordance with their colliding political convictions.
At the second layer, which came as a consequence of the first layer, was the intra-communal strife that developed between the Protestant and Catholic communities of Northern Ireland whose political loyalties, interfaced with religious affiliation, were dictated as such by the scenario described in the first layer. The antagonisms that ensued out of these divergent and conflicting political and religious convictions made it seemingly impossible to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, especially with the existence of hard-line groups and their paramilitaries on both sides of the divide.
At the third layer is the sovereignty dispute between the two state actors behind the scene: the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic of Ireland. The UK considered Northern Ireland as a province and therefore well within the ambit of its sovereignty and national territorial integrity. The Irish Government claimed it as a contiguous part of Irish territory and thus legally belonging to the Irish Republic’s sovereignty. It is this colliding ‘sovereignties’ over Northern Ireland that stoked the embers of conflict in that part of Europe.
Given these layers simultaneously at work in the Northern Ireland conflict, the question is how was it possible that a successful peace process came about that led to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement that put a halt to the historically-rooted bloody war that took thousands of lives and brought political and economic instability as well as insecurity to the people of Northern Ireland?
There are, no doubt, several factors that brought about the return of peace to Northern Ireland. Some of these factors can be cited such as the mediation role of the United States of America, the emergence of the European Union of which both UK and the Irish Republic are members, the peace efforts of several local and international NGOs, and even the military stalemate with which the warring paramilitaries in Northern Ireland found themselves in. All contributed in no small way to the peace process that led to the Belfast Agreement.
But to our mind, one key factor that really underpinned and inevitably animated the peace process is the political maturity of all the actors directly involved in the conflict. This is the very factor that allowed all other factors to effectively come into play to make the peace agreement in Northern Ireland a reality; the very factor that until now sustains the peace gains of the Belfast Agreement.
One hallmark of political maturity is the sacrifice of group and national interests. In the case of Northern Ireland, this is very clear in the constitutional concerns leading to, and ending up, in the Belfast Agreement. Earlier, in 1991, the British Secretary of State, Peter Brooke, declared that the Government of the United Kingdom had no “selfish or economic strategic interests” in Northern Ireland. This was an official policy statement that reversed an earlier policy of the British Government that stated that Northern Ireland was an integral part of the United Kingdom. The same principle, expressed in more concrete terms, found its way into the Belfast Agreement. On its part, the Government of the Republic of Ireland instituted a constitutional change to the effect that it had given up its territorial claim on Northern Ireland. This was also a radical amendment of an earlier constitutional provision that made Northern Ireland a part of the territory of the Republic of Ireland.
In effect, this unprecedented compromise allowed the two governments to give full freedom to the people of Northern Ireland to democratically and collectively decide on their political status: whether to stay with the UK as part of the British Union or to unite with the rest of Ireland. Or, they could retain their status as both British and Irish. It also opens the possibility for an independent Northern Ireland state if the people therein decide so in the future.
This compromise has given the world of conflict resolution a new term: the parity of esteem. It means “the principle of political, social and cultural equality of treatment before the law and attitudes of valuing and respecting those with different beliefs, lifestyle and background”. To put it simply, this principle, which is the spirit behind the Belfast Agreement, recognizes and acknowledges the legitimacy of the divergent causes of the parties-in-conflict in Northern Ireland. In short, this translates to the equality of peoples.
In any case, British and Irish political maturity has seeped into and transformed the mindsets of the leaderships of the warring groups in Northern Ireland which made possible the negotiated political settlement of the sovereignty-based conflict in Northern Ireland in the form of the Belfast Agreement. As a result thereof, devolved institutions of governance have been established (and are still being established) jointly run by erstwhile foes, the Irish Unionists and Irish Republicans.
One of our most memorable meetings while we were in Belfast was with Rt. Hon. Jeffery Donaldson and Gerry Kelly, who now both serve as junior ministers in the Northern Irish Government. Mr. Donaldson is an ardent Unionist and a Loyalist paramilitary official while Mr. Kelly is an uncompromising Republican who is with the IRA. Not only were we fascinated sitting in the presence of two prominent personalities in the Northern Ireland conflict who, several years back, could not even face each other without shooting it out but we were also equally impressed that both have not given up the very principles which they fought for. Mr. Kelly told us in front of Mr. Donaldson that he believes the future of Northern Ireland lies with the Irish Republic. Mr. Donaldson, on the other hand, asserted that he is British and that Northern Ireland, in effect, is better off in British hands. Despite these opposing political views, both junior ministers call each other by their first names and we could discern friendship and cooperation between them.
This meeting validates our long-held position that peace negotiations require compromise in order to arrive at a certain political arrangement. But such a compromise does not extend to principles and ideology nor does it translate to giving up strategic political goals.
There is one important aspect of the Northern Ireland peace process which we found to be relevant. The objective of the Belfast Agreement is to end the violence and allow the most bitter of political foes to work together through electoral democracy and run a government that would pave the way for the final determination of the political future of Northern Ireland. This would not have been possible without the parties to the conflict agreeing to “decommissioning” or the disarmament of the paramilitaries on both sides.
But unlike the Philippine government which is demanding that the MILF disarm before a comprehensive peace agreement is inked on the negotiating table, “decommissioning” in the context of the Northern Ireland peace process came as a result of the Belfast Agreement in April 1998. In fact, “decommissioning” has taken a gradual approach, a long process that keeps step with the progress of the devolution of political power to the Northern Ireland government. When we were in Belfast the “decommissioning” of Unionist paramilitaries was not yet complete, and given the fact that the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998, one wonders why it would take more than ten years for “decommissioning” to be completed. That is, if one were totally ignorant of the complicated and difficult process that “decommissioning” entails.
There are, of course, recalcitrant minority factions on both sides of the political fence who refuse to recognize the Belfast Agreement or wait until the latter succeeds or fails. But these factions remain isolated and efforts by the mainstream Unionist and Republican groups to bring them into the fold or rein them in continue.
One important lesson is drawn from this Northern Ireland experience though. “Decommissioning” or disarmament can only be done if a comprehensive peace agreement between the parties to the conflict is concluded. It cannot come before that. Otherwise, it would be putting the cart before the horse. No revolutionary liberation movement would ever agree to “decommission” until the other party, which is normally the state, settles for a signed political agreement which would, by logic, include withdrawal of state security forces from the occupied territories. Less than that would be tantamount to surrender.
After our educational trip to London and Belfast, we could not help but compare our peace process in Mindanao with that of the one still taking place in Northern Ireland. There are similarities and dissimilarities and many can be cited. But for the sake of brevity, we can only mention a few.
As already mentioned and explained, the sovereignty-based conflict in Northern Ireland is more complex than the Bangsamoro Problem. Two sovereign nation-states and two communities of people are involved in Northern Ireland. In Mindanao and Sulu, the conflict is between the Bangsamoro nation and the Philippine nation-state.
In terms of the magnitude of destruction quantified by the number of lives lost, material losses, and human displacement in Mindanao and Sulu, the Mindanao conflict is considered more devastating than the Northern Ireland conflict. This is not to say that the Northern Ireland conflict is not devastating. All armed conflicts are destructive. And that is what the Northern Ireland conflict had wrought on the people of Northern Ireland for three decades. However, figures would show that the level of destruction is very much higher in the Mindanao Conflict. In the recent fighting in Mindanao since August of 2008, no less than 600,000 people were displaced and over 2,000 Moro homes were destroyed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). During the MNLF-led war in the 70s, more than 200,000 people were killed, over one million were internally displaced, and about 500,000 Moro refugees had to flee to the neighboring state of Sabah, Malaysia. This would be replayed in the all-out wars against the MILF in 2000 and 2003 when again millions would be displaced and thousands would perish.
Whereas on record, conflict-related deaths in Northern Ireland from 1969-1994 numbered 3,173.
Nonetheless, we are not concerned with comparing levels of destruction between the Northern Ireland conflict and the Mindanao conflict. Figures could never really measure the detrimental effects of war, particularly the psychological aspect, on the lives of the people concerned.
Our purpose here, which was the objective of our journey to Northern Ireland, is to draw lessons from the experience of the latter in its peace process and use these lessons to validate our own experience in the Mindanao peace process.
Indeed, there are very important observations we were able to draw from our exposure trip to Northern Ireland. But to say it again, the most profound lesson we learned is the pivotal role that political maturity plays in resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. In the Northern Ireland conflict, the political maturity of all the actors involved – state and non-state – was the ‘blade’ that unknotted the Gordian knot, so to speak.
Unfortunately, in our engagements on the negotiating table with the Philippine government, we do not find even a semblance of political maturity on the side of our adversary.
There is no political maturity when the Philippine government invariably turns its back on political compromises and reneges on its commitments to signed agreements with the Moro liberation movement as what it did to the MNLF in 1976 and 1996 and recently to the MILF in 2000, 2003 and 2008.
There is no political maturity when the Philippine government embarrasses itself before the international community by aborting an initialed MOA-AD with the MILF on the very day that such a conflict-resolving compromise political agreement was about to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
There is no political maturity when the Philippine government does a Pontius Pilate by disowning and scuttling its own peace panel, renouncing an agreement that it jointly crafted with the MILF for almost four years, and subsequently announcing its total withdrawal from the negotiating table.
There is no political maturity when key officials in the Philippine government cannot put their acts together and exercise a strong collective political will to resolve the Mindanao conflict through a negotiated political settlement with the MILF.
There is no political maturity when the Philippine government reverts to military solutions and resorts to repressive counter-insurgency measures and propaganda demonization of the Moro nation to resolve the almost five-century old Bangsamoro Problem which even the Spaniards and the Americans were unable to put an end to during their stay in the Philippines.
There is no political maturity when the Philippine government undermines the role of the third party facilitator to the peace negotiation, Malaysia, whose role as such the former officially requested for in 2001.
And, if I may add, there is no political maturity when Filipino government officials involved in the peace process shed crocodile tears in front of the media over the misery and sufferings of Moro refugees while the Philippine military keeps up with its relentless operations in Moro areas.
This is not political maturity but deception shamelessly being played out before the eyes of the world.
Such deception will never put an end to the sovereignty-based conflict in the Bangsamoro Homeland.
The Arroyo regime has invited the British Government through former Prime Minister Tony Blair to lend a helping hand in the peace process in Mindanao. That’s fine with us. But, the Arroyo regime should do more than extend invitations to and involve ‘eminent persons’ in the Mindanao peace process. The more fitting thing to do is for the regime to learn from the British and Irish governments the virtue of political maturity.
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